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(PERSPECTIVES)
Investing in the Presence of Massive Flows:
The Case of MSCI Country Reclassifications
by
Terence C. Burnham
Chapman University Argyros School of Business and Economics
Harry Gakidis
Acadian Asset Management
Jeffrey Wurgler 1
NYU Stern School of Business and NBER

January 17, 2017

Approximately $10 trillion is benchmarked to Morgan Stanley Capital
International’s Developed, Emerging, Frontier, and standalone market
indexes. Reclassifications from one index to another require thousands of
investors to decide how to react. We study a comprehensive sample of past
reclassifications to guide this decision. Reclassified markets’ prices
substantially overshoot between the announcement and effective dates—
prices fall when a market moves from an index with more benchmarked
ownership to one with less, such from Emerging to Frontier, and viceversa—but revert within a year. We identify alpha-maximizing responses
to reclassifications for both tightly benchmarked and more flexible
investors.
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Introduction
Morgan Stanley Capital International’s Developed Markets, Emerging Markets,
and Frontier Markets Indexes provide benchmarks for stock markets at different stages of
development. The Indexes are used to allocate trillions of dollars in equities by thousands
of proper indexers, active asset managers, pension funds, hedge funds, banks, and
individuals around the world. 2
The MSCI’s Index Policy Committee reclassifies markets when investability
conditions change. 3 Qatar and the United Arab Emirates graduated from Frontier to
Emerging status in June 2014 after institutional improvements, for example. Trinidad and
Tobago was declared unsuitable for even the Frontier index in February 2011, on the
other hand, and since June of that year has been tracked onlty as a standalone market.
Most recently, MSCI upgraded Pakistan to the Emerging index, effective May 2017. A
fuller list of reclassifications since 2000 is in Table 1. 4
Given the huge importance of the MSCI indexes and the fact that reclassifications
require thousands of investors to decide how to react, it is surprising that there has been
almost no study of what happens around reclassification events. 5 Should a benchmarked
investor trade at the announcement date? Wait a few months until the effective date?
2

See MSCI (2016a). Other index providers also classify countries into development categories, including
Dow Jones, FTSE, Russell, and S&P. The MSCI indexes are by far the most followed.
3
These involve openness to foreign ownership, the ease of capital flows, the efficiency of the operational
framework, and the stability of the institutional framework. Openness criteria include investor qualification
requirements, foreign ownership limits, foreign room levels, and the rights of foreign vs. domestic
investors. Ease-of-Flows criteria include capital flow restrictions and degree of currency market
liberalization. Operational Framework criteria include registration & account setup difficulty, market
regulations, information flow, clearing and settlement, custody, registry/depository considerations, trade
execution, transferability, stock lending and short selling. Also considered are the degree of competition
among financial services providers and the stability of the institutional framework. There is an additional
requirement on gross national income per capita for Developed status. See MSCI Global Market
Accessibility Review (2016b).
4
The transition matrix in Figure 2 shows the effective dates of (non-partial) reclassification events
announced since 2000. We also exclude Serbia’s and Lithuania’s 2008 reclassifications. Their
announcements conditioned the final decision on aspects of market performance between the
announcement and the potential effective date, thus rendering ambiguous what investors should be doing in
the meantime. Every announcement before or since has been an unambiguous declaration that a change will
be made. In addition, the Frontier index was introduced in 2007. We do not include the markets included at
the inception of this index since the announcement and effective dates were nearly contemporaneous and,
presumably, the short-term flows associated with the classification would be small.
5
The most related study is Saidi, Prasad, and Naik (2012), who focus on a small number of Middle Eastern
countries’ reclassifications between Frontier and Emerging indexes.
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Wait for a year while the dust settles? Break the tie based on non-alpha considerations
such as tracking error? Does it matter whether the investor tracks the new or old index?
Are “upgrades” always good and “downgrades” always bad? Are there opportunities for
non-benchmarked investors?
To answer these questions, we study a comprehensive sample of reclassifications
since 2000. While it is impossible to observe flows directly, we find an intuitive result
that appears to highlight their importance. Using MSCI data on the extent of
benchmarking (which includes both passive indexers and active managers who use an
index as a benchmark), we find that when a market is moved from a less-benchmarked to
a more-benchmarked index, such as from Frontier to Emerging, prices rise between the
announcement and effective date by around 15%. By one year after the effective date,
however, this upward price pressure has fully reverted. The reverse pattern of
overshooting happens when a market is reclassified to a less-benchmarked index.
For investors, the large returns around reclassifications illustrate the importance
of properly accommodating the event, so we delineate the alpha-maximizing strategies
for benchmarked and more flexible investors. The results also shed broader light on
market resiliency and price pressures writ large, because MSCI reclassifications are
uniquely important events for the markets involved. The patterns are clearly inconsistent
with a simple “upgrades are good, downgrades are bad” hypothesis. If a reclassification is
“good,” it should be permanently good. Instead, what appears to drive the results is the
difference in demand for the reclassified market by old and new benchmarkers. In the
short run, the market has trouble absorbing the net flows without price pressure, but
eventually prices return to where they started.

Supply, Demand, and Index Inclusion Effects
It might surprise the layman that stock market prices are often studied at the
highest practitioner and academic levels with no explicit reference to supply and demand.
For many purposes in finance, that is a reasonable approach, but it is hard to justify in the
context of the potentially large rebalancing-driven demand changes around market
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reclassifications. What does prior research lead us to expect may happen around these
events?
Efficient markets theory—which is embraced by many passive indexers—would,
in the extreme, imply that we will observe no price change. Under this view,
reclassifications are inconsequential because stock fundamentals are unchanged. They are
simply decisions made by a committee of non-investors who are not even attempting to
evaluate investment merits and are using largely public information. Any observed
change in return properties such as risk or liquidity would be attributed to the structural
changes that drove reclassifications in the first place, not the reclassifications themselves.
An alternative view, associated with inefficient markets and active management,
is that stock prices sometimes respond to supply and demand forces unrelated to
fundamentals. Adherents of this view would also acknowledge the structural and
operational changes leading to reclassification events, but they would suggest that the
trading of passive index funds—not to mention other categories of benchmarked
investors—might contribute to the very distortions that their investors deny.
The accumulated evidence from other index inclusion settings suggests that we
should not be surprised if reclassifications to cause price dynamics. The classic research
in this area involves S&P 500 inclusions. Harris and Gurel (1986) and Shleifer (1986)
both argue that such inclusions contain no information about stock fundamentals,
consistent with the stated position of the S&P Index Policy Committee, and both find that
inclusions are associated with price jumps of a few percentage points. One important
point of disagreement is that Harris and Gurel maintain that this jump eventually reverts.
In October 1989, the S&P changed its annoucement policy. It separated the
announcement date of a change from the effective date. Lynch and Mendenhall (1997)
find that this policy introduced a jump on the announcement, a further rise between the
announcement and effective date, and a partial reversion thereafter. Since the effective
date is even more plainly informationless than the announcement itself, this is compelling
evidence that inclusions induce price pressures.
Additional evidence has piled on since these studies. Petajisto (2011) finds that
the S&P 500 inclusion effects have grown since the early studies, and also shows that
there are inclusion effects for the Russell 2000. Kaul, Mehrota, and Morck (2000) study a
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unique experiment from the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 and find more evidence of
demand-induced price changes, thus extending the evidence on index inclusion effects to
international markets. In a setting closer to our own, albeit still involving individual
stock-level events and only a three-year time sample, Chakrabarti, Huang, Jayaraman,
and Lee (2005) find that inclusions into the MSCI country indexes beget a rise between
the announcement and effective date, which partially reverts. See Petajisto (2009) and
Wurgler (2011) for further overviews of this literature.
In modern, liquid markets, how can information-free inclusion effects persist?
Basic supply and demand considerations are apparently overwhelming short-term
“arbitrage” forces. Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) point out that the classical efficient
markets argument articulated by Scholes (1972), that sophisticated investors would
elastically supply new investor demand for the included stock because they can simply
short an equivalent stock, isn’t realistic. The majority of an individual stock’s variability
is idiosyncratic. There is simply no washing away of this risk through a long-short trade,
and no way to form a portfolio of inclusions when they are isolated events.
The classical logic fails even more strongly at the level of MSCI country
reclassifications. Who would have shorted a basket of U.A.E. stocks to accommodate the
sudden demand from benchmarkers that followed its upgrade to the Emerging index?
What exactly would those investors buy in order to hedge the risk that U.A.E.
fundamentals improved while they were short? Put together, the theory and evidence
suggest that we should not be surprised if MSCI country reclassifications generate
interesting price dynamics. How interesting depends on how much demand actually
changes. We approach this question next.

Potential Flows Around Reclassifications
In the case of MSCI reclassifications, thousands of index-driven funds must
consider how to adjust their holdings in a short period of time, and passive indexers will
presumably do so fully. In light of the $10 trillion now benchmarked to the MSCI
indexes, the collective action of these non-fundamental traders may be large.
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To get a sense of the magnitudes involved it is helpful to understand the multiple
layers of MSCI indexes. A highly simplified explanation is as follows. Each index
involved is roughly value-weighted (to be precise, free-float weighted). Country return
indexes are averages of major stocks trading in the local market. Regional sub-indexes
are averages of a set of country indexes. Finally, the major indexes, including Developed,
Emerging, and Frontier indexes, are averages of combinations of the above.
The roughly value-weighted structure of the indexes allows us to estimate the size
of the potential flows associated with a reclassification. If benchmarked investors hold
shares at index weights, then, at least mathematically, the net percentage flow is the
difference between fraction of the new index held by index-tracking investors and the
fraction of the old index held by index-tracking investors.
Although actual flows driven by reclassification events are difficult to track, it is
possible to obtain some rough upper bounds using Table 2. The key data in Table 2 are
estimates of net percentage index ownership. We are grateful to MSCI for providing
these data.
For example, classification as an Emerging Market entails inclusion not only in
the MSCI Emerging Markets Index, where the percentage of benchmarked ownership is
high (45% as of June 2014), but also in the All Country World Index, where the
percentage of benchmarked ownership is low (6% as of June 2014). The cap-weighted
structure of the Indexes implies that approximately 51% of a given Emerging Market is
owned by benchmarkers at that date.
A further promotion from Emerging to Developed, on the other hand, may
actually cause a net decline in index-tracking ownership, at least in recent years. The
country’s ACWI status does not change, but—in the most recent data—it stands to lose
its 45% ownership from its Emerging index affiliation while replacing this with only
about 32% from its new inclusions into the World index, the Europe, Australasia and Far
East index, or (typically) either the Europe or Asia ex-Japan index. This net decline may
be contrary to intuition, given that so many more dollars are indexed to Developed than
Emerging, and perhaps a general sense that an “upgrade” must surely be better for net
demand than a “downgrade.” Which brings up an interesting general point: In the same
way there may be a larger clientele for a corporate bond at one rating than one at the
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next-higher rating, whether a country is upgraded or downgraded need have no
fundamental bearing on aggregate net demand by benchmarked investors. Upgrades
usually correlate with an increase in net benchmarker demand according to the figures in
Table 2, but not always.
Using these coarse estimates to calculate reclassification-driven flows should be
done with great caution. First, fund families that track the old index in one vehicle and
the new index in another may be able to transfer some of their holdings through internal
accounting, which would not contribute any price pressure. Second, actively-managed
funds using an index as a benchmark may, as a group, overweight or underweight some
countries relative to their actual index weights. Third, benchmarkers may decide that the
reclassification event is too small to be worth responding to any time soon. In general,
any tracking error and portfolio alpha consequences of a reclassification will typically be
far greater for the followers of the lesser-developed index, given its smaller total cap.
Fourth, to the extent that investability criteria differ between the old and the new index,
an upgrade means that some stocks must be sold by old indexers and not bought by new
indexers; a downgrade means that some stocks must be bought by new indexers that are
not being sold by old indexers. We return to this point below.
In light of these and other limitations, it is most appropriate to regard the net
flows to reclassifications implied by Table 2 as directionally correct but otherwise an
“idealized” estimate, most likely a slightly overstated one for many less-developed
markets, of the net flows that follow reclassifications. In this paper we sort events only by
the ordering of net demand by benchmarkers, namely, Emerging, Developed, Frontier,
standalone. Detailed estimates of demand elasticies of prices, for example, are
unwarranted.
One last note before getting to returns. Reclassifications affect not just the country
in question. The freed-up capital turns into a degree of buying pressure on those
remaining constituents in the old index, and a degree of selling pressure on others in the
new index. We will not explore these effects here, but in the case of a move between
Frontier and Emerging, for example, they could be significant. An upgraded market will
tend to have high weight in its old index, leaving plenty of capital to be reallocated across
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its former cohort, and vice-versa. These spillover effects are an interesting area for future
research.

Returns Around Reclassifications
The ultimate question is whether, and how, reclassifications affect returns.
Typically, when a market’s accessibility has been improving or deteriorating, MSCI
places it on a watch list, gathers feedback from institutional investors over the next
several months, and then announces a decision to reclassify the market or to remove it
from the watch list. If the market is reclassified, MSCI specifies a date, again several
months down the road, at which the reclassification becomes effective.
For most investors, the relevant dates are the announcement and effective dates of
reclassifications. We look for patterns between these two dates as well as for the year
after the effective date to detect any reversion. We do not examine price dynamics around
the “watch list” date because it has no clear investment implication for the majority of
benchmarkers.
We measure alphas on the reclassified country’s index in two ways. For investors
using the old benchmark, alpha is measured as the country index return over that
benchmark. For investors in the new benchmark, the relevant comparison is with the new
benchmark. For reclassifications from (to) standalone status, we calculate the old (new)
benchmark as zero and track total returns. 6
Figure 1 presents the main results. In the top panel, we track the average returns
on country indexes for the nine reclassifications that, according to the estimates in Table
2, most likely resulted in less ownership by benchmarkers. In these cases, there was
likely to have been net selling pressure as investors adjusted. The results are indeed
consistent with short-term selling pressure which subsequently abated. The average total
6

A limitation of our returns data is the use of MSCI country indexes rather than the precise subset of stocks
affected by a switch. In an upgrade, some companies that were allowed into the old index may not make the
cut. For them, the selling pressure from the old indexers is not offset by buying demand from the new
indexers. Likewise, in a downgrade, stocks in the old index will be affected but additional stocks will now
meet the new, lower bar. This issue is attenuated by the value-weighted nature of the country indexes, since
the largest stocks in the country will always be included in either the upgrade portfolio or the downgrade
portfolio. In any case, the use of country indexes typically biases our results “against” detecting an effect.

8

return between the announcement and effective dates was -12.5%, but this loss was more
than recovered in the 23.3% total return in the year after the effective date. Using returns
relative to the original index or the new index—two notions of alpha—leads to the same
impression of a large fall followed by a relatively complete reversion.
In the bottom panel, we track the average returns for the eight reclassifications
that most likely resulted in more ownership by benchmarkers, and therefore net buying
pressure around the event. Here, and also strongly consistent with an overshooting pricepressure pattern, we see the opposite pattern in returns. There is a 23.2% total return
between the announcement date and effective date, but this is to a large extent given back
by the -12.4% return after the effective date. 7
These differences in average returns between less- and more-benchmarked
reclassifications are so large that they are statistically significant despite the modest
sample size. For example, the -12.5% announcement-to-effective date total return in the
less-benchmarked case is significantly lower than the corresponding 23.2% return in the
more-benchmarked case (t = -2.1). The 23.3% post-effective total return in the lessbenchmarked case is significantly greater than the corresponding -12.4% post-effective
date return in the more-benchmarked case (t = 2.6).
How do upgrades and downgrades compare? Buying pressure tends to be higher
for upgrades, so perhaps it is the direction of the reclassification that really matters. An
upgrade would seem to increase visibility and liquidity, after all, and such effects might
be reflected in positive returns even after the event. In unreported results, we split the
sample between upgrades and downgrades. The results are similar to the split across
predicted net flows. (In fact, they are slightly weaker, but the sorts are hard to separate
statistically because the direction of reclassification and the direction of new flows by
benchmakers are highly correlated.) The fact that the two splits lead to similar results
tells us something important and consistent with only the price pressure story. If upgrades
were good for valuations, they should be permanently good. If downgrades were bad for
valuations, they should be permanently bad. Instead, the data show that alphas between
the announcement and effective dates tend to revert in the same pattern that we see in the

7

The similarity in returns reported in this paragraph and the previous paragraph is coincidental.
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Figure 1 sorts. A simplistic “upgrades are good, downgrades are bad” view of price
dynamics around MSCI reclassifications is therefore not supported in the data.
What happens right around the announcement and effective dates? If the action is
too fast then the strategic opportunities are limited. To investigate this, we excluded short
windows around the event dates, but found that the results are only slightly weakened.
For example, the average total return between two days after the announcement date and
two days before the effective date is -9.2% for classifications that decrease benchmarked
ownership and 21.3% for classifications that increase it. These closely resemble the
numbers in Figure 1. The post-effective reversion effects are also similar upon excluding
short windows around event dates. In other words, the advice suggested by Figure 1 is
potentially actionable.
Finally, we examined risk and liquidity patterns around reclassifications. An
interesting possibility is that the reclassified country index’s beta with respect to the new
index increases over time and the beta with respect to the old index decreases. 8 We did
not find any significant changes, however. We also looked at the first-order
autocorrelation of country indexes as a proxy for liquidity, but we found no changes in
autocorrelations for upgrades or downgrades.

Investment Implications
Our core finding is that countries transitioning into a less-indexed classification
face net selling pressure, and negative alpha, between the announcement and effective
dates. After the move becomes effective and the selling pressure abates, there is a
reversion with positive alpha. The opposite is true when countries move toward a moreindexed classification. In each case the long-run return is roughly flat.
For passive indexers devoted solely to matching a benchmark, none of these
patterns matter. Those investors must rebalance at, or very near, the effective dates. But
there are very important implications for benchmarkers that have discretion. Table 3
summarizes the alpha-maximizing strategies implied by the evidence.

8

See Vijh (1994) and Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005) on such a pattern from S&P 500 inclusions.

10

In some cases, the best trade is unambiguous. When a market is downgraded from
Emerging to Frontier, for example, those benchmarked to the Frontier index should buy
on the effective date. This not only eliminates the tracking error of buying early, it avoids
the low returns associated with the net selling pressure between the announcement and
effective dates. Conversely, for upgrades from Frontier to Emerging, those benchmarked
to Frontier should wait to sell on the effective date. This allows Frontier benchmarkers to
ride the net buying pressure before the effective date and, again, eliminates tracking error.
In other cases, the optimal strategy is less obvious, and alpha effects must be
balanced against tracking error. Consider a reclassification from Frontier to Emerging
from the perspective of Emerging benchmarkers. Buying at the effective date has the
benefit of no tracking error. But it also means buying at the peak: the buying-pressuredriven return between announcement and effective has been missed, while any posteffective reversion has still to be endured. There are two strategies to avoid negative
alpha. One is to buy at announcement and hold through both the run-up and the reversion.
The other strategy is to buy well after the effective date, when the cycle will have played
out. Both strategies involve accepting some tracking error.
The advice for absolute return investors is plain enough to not be worth
tabulating. They should underweight the reclassified market in situations when its
expected returns are low and vice-versa. Figure 1 clearly identifies these situations.

Conclusion
MSCI market reclassifications do not happen every day, but when they do happen
they can be important events for thousands of international investors. The analysis of past
reclassifications point to strategies to help MSCI-benchmarked investors avoid, or even
exploit, price pressures, and more generally it sheds new light on the effects of marketlevel demand shocks. The short time series we have suggests that the extent of
benchmark-driven ownership, and hence the potential consequences of reclassifications,
is only increasing.
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Figure 1. MSCI Country Index Returns Around Index Reclassifications. Returns on
the affected market’s MSCI Country Index, including total returns and excess returns
over the old or new benchmark index (Frontier, Emerging, or Developed). For
reclassifications from (to) standalone status, we replace excess returns with total returns.

Panel A. Reclassifications to a Less-Benchmarked Index (n=9)
Announcement to
Effective Date

Effective Date to
One Year After

30.0
23.3
17.9

20.0
10.0

Average Total Return (%)

5.3

Excess over Old Index
0.0

Excess over New Index

-10.0
-12.5 -11.0 -12.4
-20.0
-30.0

Panel B. Reclassifications to a More-Benchmarked Index (n=8)
Announcement to
Effective Date

Effective Date to
One Year After

30.0
23.2
20.0

21.2
15.0
Average Total Return (%)

10.0

Excess over Old Index
0.0

Excess over New Index

-10.0
-20.0

-12.4 -13.5
-21.2

-30.0
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Table 1. MSCI Market Reclassifications, 2000-2015. DM denotes the MSCI Developed World Index, EM denotes the MSCI Emerging
Markets Index, and FM denotes the MSCI Frontier Markets Index. The FM Index was introduced in 2007.
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Table 2. Benchmarked Ownership by MSCI Market Classification. The percentage
of ownership by benchmarkers is estimated as the ratio of benchmarked assets of that
index, from private correspondence with MSCI, to the total capitalization of that index,
estimated from MSCI Index Factsheets data. Assets benchmarked to the Frontier Markets
Index are estimated from the Emerging Portfolio Fund Research (EPFR) database. The
Total % Benchmarked to the Developed Market Index includes the average of Europe
and Asia (ex-Japan).
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Table 3. Alpha-Maximizing Strategies Around MSCI Market Reclassifications. Historical alpha-maximizing strategies based on
sample of 17 reclassifications between 2000 and 2015. Note that some multi-level reclassifications, e.g. Frontier to Developed, have
not occurred in this sample. Appropriate strategy is inferred from observed events.
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